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Abstract 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has emerged as an important approach for addressing the 
social and environmental impact of company activities. Yet companies are increasingly expected to 
go beyond this. They are now often expected to assist in addressing many of the world’s most 
pressing problems, including climate change and poverty. With increasing expectations placed on 
business, this article asks if CSR is capable of delivering on these larger issues based on evidence 
from the oil and gas sector. Looking at companies from developed countries, such as Exxon and 
Shell, as well as companies from emerging economies, such as Brazil’s Petrobras and Hungary’s 
MOL, the article investigates the potential of CSR for addressing three important challenges in the 
business-society relationship: the environment, development and governance. 
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Companies are increasingly expected to assist in addressing many of the world’s pressing problems 
including climate change, poverty and HIV/AIDS. According to a 2007 survey by the consultancy 
firm McKinsey carried out amongst the chief executive officers (CEOs) of companies, 95% of the 
CEOs believe that society has greater expectations than it did five years ago that companies will 
assume public responsibilities. More than half of the CEOs believe that these expectations will 
further increase significantly during the next five years.2  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has emerged as a business approach for addressing the 
social and environmental impact of company activities. Companies from the oil and gas sector have 
been at the centre of CSR development. With increasing expectations placed on business, one needs 
to ask if CSR is able to fulfill these larger expectations. Therefore, the aim of this article is to 
analyse CSR’s potential and limitations for contributing towards wider societal “challenges”. The 
article investigates the key areas of CSR policies where oil companies are expected to make a 
positive contribution: improvements in environmental performance, development and governance. 
We ask to what extent the current CSR agenda can yield positive improvements in these three areas. 
 
The article is based on the author’s book Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility – Oil 
Multinationals and Social Challenges.3 It is the culmination of more than 10 years of researching 
the oil and gas sector and the author has had hundreds of conversations with oil company staff, civil 
society advocates, government officials, consultants, development specialists, journalists and local 
people around these issues.4 In addition to interviews with oil company staff and insiders, the 
findings are based on the analysis of twenty social and environmental reports of selected oil and gas 
companies.5 
 
What is CSR? 
 
In order to understand the meaning of contemporary CSR, it is useful to go back in time. While 
CSR is a recent term, preoccupation with business ethics and the social dimensions of business 
activity has a long history. Business practices based on moral principles and ‘controlled greed’ have 
been advocated by pre-Christian western thinkers such as Cicero in the first century BC and their 
non-western colleagues such as Indian statesman and philosopher Kautilya in the fourth century 
BC, while Islam and the medieval Christian church publicly condemned certain business practices, 
notably usury.   
 
The modern precursors of CSR can be traced back to the nineteenth century boycotts of foodstuffs 
produced with slave labour, the moral vision of business leaders such as Cadbury and Salt who 
promoted the social welfare of their workers, and the Nuremberg war crimes trials after the Second 
World War, which saw the directors of the German firm I.G. Farben found guilty of mass murder 
and slavery.6  From a historical perspective, CSR is simply the latest manifestation of earlier 
debates as to the role of business in society.  What is new, according to Fabig and Boele is that 
“today’s debates are conducted at the intersection of development, environment and human rights, 
and are more global in outlook than earlier in this century or even in the 1960s”.7 
 
While the role of business in society seems to have been changing for some time, there is no 
agreement among observers on what CSR stands for or where the boundaries of CSR lie. Different 
people have interpreted CSR differently. For example, CSR means different things to practitioners 
seeking to implement CSR inside companies than it does to researchers trying to establish CSR as a 
discipline. It can also mean something different to civil society groups than it does to the private 
sector.  
 
The responsibilities of companies in developing nations are also defined differently depending on 
the social – especially national – context8; for instance, CSR among Malaysian firms is partly 
motivated by religious notions and Islam’s prescriptions of certain business practices9; the specific 
flavour of CSR in Argentina can be partly attributed to Argentina’s economic crisis in December 
200110; while companies in South Africa focus on issues of racial inequality as a result of the 
unique legacy of the apartheid11. Companies in Malaysia focus on charitable activities especially 
around Muslim and Chinese religious holidays, while companies in South Africa focus on black 
empowerment schemes. Therefore, CSR or “being socially responsible” can mean different things 
to different people in different countries. 
 
Although these differences in the understanding of CSR are perhaps inevitable given the wide range 
of issues that companies need to deal with, they can be frustrating, not least to company managers 
who might prefer a bounded concept similar to quality control or financial accounting. Instead, 
managers find themselves wrestling with issues as diverse as animal rights, corporate governance, 
environmental management, corporate philanthropy, stakeholder management, labour rights, health 
issues and community development. To complicate matters further, new terms have entered the 
vocabulary of business–society debates such as corporate accountability, stakeholder engagement 
and sustainability, aimed variously at replacing, redefining or complementing the CSR concept. 
Indeed, some companies now prefer to use terms such as “sustainability” or “citizenship” instead of 
CSR.  
 
We should also be careful not to superimpose Western notions of CSR on the reality in developing 
countries. Philanthropy is a key example and highly relevant to the oil and gas sector. In Europe, the 
notion of philanthropy is often dismissed and usually not regarded as part of CSR because it does 
not relate to the impact of the day-to-day operations of the firm. But firms are expected to actively 
assist their local communities in many developing countries. Studies on countries as diverse as 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Malaysia and Argentina suggest that philanthropic activities are considered the 
main social responsibility of business in these countries.12 Many philanthropic activities by business 
in developing countries are likely to be genuine and may be guided by traditional notions of 
business obligations with regards to health or education issues, in the absence of the sort of 
government action that is taken for granted in developed countries. Yet these activities are not 
regarded as CSR by many Europeans, whose governments have shouldered many social 
responsibilities related to health, education and poverty alleviation. 
 
Given the problem of encompassing different viewpoints in one inclusive definition of CSR, 
Blowfield and Frynas have proposed to think of CSR as an umbrella term for a variety of theories 
and practices that each recognize the following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their 
impact on society and the natural environment, sometimes beyond that of legal compliance and the 
liability of individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with 
whom they do business (e.g. within supply chains); and (c) that business needs to manage its 
relationship with wider society, be that for reasons of commercial viability or to add value to 
society.13 This general definition is adopted in this article. 
 
CSR in oil and gas 
 
The nature of an industry determines CSR concerns and the social concerns are highly diverse 
between different industries. For instance, the clothing industry raises issues of employment 
conditions and the responsibility of firms within complex global supply chains14, fast-food 
restaurants raise the issue of obesity15, while the main issue in the tobacco industry is the long-term 
health effects of smoking16. These concerns may vary between countries, but the key concerns 
related to an industry’s operations are typically shared in most countries, and this is no different in 
the oil and gas sector. Nigeria is very different from Azerbaijan, but some of the key concerns 
related to the oil and gas sector are very similar in both countries – the environmental impact of the 
industry such as oil spills, the social impact of the industry on local communities and macro-
economic difficulties created by the inflow of oil revenues.  
 
The oil and gas sector has been among the leading industries in championing CSR. This is at least 
partly due to the highly visible negative effects of day-to-day operations such as oil spills and the 
resulting protests by civil society groups and indigenous people. Prominent examples of publicised 
industry ‘debacles’ include oil tanker accidents such as the Exxon-Valdez, indigenous unrest such 
as anti-Shell protests in Nigeria and the involvement of oil companies in human rights abuses such 
as BP in Colombia. Such events – widely reported by the media – have put particular pressure on 
multinational oil companies such as Shell and BP, which are perhaps more visible and their brand 
image is more vulnerable than companies in some other sectors of the economy. The oil and gas 
industry appears to be under greater pressure to manage its relationship with wider society, as 
illustrated by the quote from Lord Browne, former chief executive of BP:  
 
Geology has not restricted the distribution of hydrocarbons to areas governed as open 
pluralistic democracies. The cutting edge of the issue of corporate responsibility comes from 
the fact that circumstances don’t always make it easy for companies to operate as they 
would wish.17 
 
Notwithstanding the motives of the executives, oil companies pay greater lip service to CSR and 
they engage more with local communities than multinationals in many other sectors. This is 
demonstrated, amongst others, by the remarkable growth of corporate codes of conduct and social 
reporting, not only among European or American firms but also the likes of Petrobras, Indian Oil 
and Kuwait Petroleum. Oil companies have also embraced major international CSR initiatives such 
as the United Nations Global Compact and the UK Government’s Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. A small number of multinational oil companies have invested in renewable 
energy, as an alternative source of income once the world’s oil and gas resources run out.  
 
Furthermore, oil companies have initiated, funded and implemented significant community 
development schemes. Oil companies now help to build schools and hospitals, launch micro-credit 
schemes for local people and assist youth employment programs, particularly in developing 
countries. They participate in partnerships with established development agencies such as the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), while using non-governmental organizations and specialist consultancies to implement 
development programs on the ground. 
 
Given the importance of CSR activities, the oil and gas sector is an instructive example for 
analysing to what extent the CSR movement can transform practices in an industry. However, the 
most important observation is that CSR has been adopted in the industry very unevenly. Royal 
Dutch/Shell and BP have specifically been recognised as leaders in corporate citizenship world-
wide. They spearheaded major international CSR initiatives such as the Global Compact and the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). They have become significant players in renewable energy and 
have professed to combat carbon dioxide emissions in order to minimize their contribution to global 
warming. But other companies appear to have done less. The improvements by Shell and BP have 
often been contrasted with the relative lack of social and environmental engagement by Exxon – a 
company of a similar size to Shell and BP.18  
 
However, Exxon has also quietly made voluntary improvements to its social and environmental 
performance. As this article demonstrates, oil companies from developing countries such as Brazil’s 
Petrobras are also initiating social and environmental programmes, and have spent large sums on 
local community development. This suggests that the CSR movement is global in nature and that 
there are increased expectations of what companies are responsible for.  
 
The author’s findings suggest that the companies most engaged in CSR are companies that expand 
internationally and are dependent on international financial markets and international reputations. 
This can help to explain, for instance, the growing engagement in CSR initiatives by companies 
such as Brazil’s Petrobras and Indian Oil, which are increasingly operating at an international level. 
In contrast, CSR has not been fully embraced by companies from a number of developing countries 
such as China and Malaysia. For instance, PetroChina continues to invest in the most repressive 
regimes such as Burma and Sudan, where the major international oil companies have long 
withdrawn.  
 
One needs to remember that the majority of the world’s oil and gas is owned by state-owned 
companies from non-Western countries such as Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran – not corporations 
such as Exxon and Shell. Indeed, about half of the world's known oil and gas reserves are controlled 
by just five national oil companies in the Middle East - Saudi Aramco, Kuwait Petroleum, the 
National Iranian Oil Company, Sonatrach of Algeria and the Abu Dhabi National Oil and six out of 
the world’s ten largest oil and gas producing companies are state-owned.19 The oil and gas 
production of the state-owned companies is largely domestic; for instance, the national companies 
of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Mexico have no foreign production. The social and environmental records 
of these companies are usually under less scrutiny from civil society groups; we know even very 
little about their social and environmental impact. What follows is that multinational companies 
primarily drive the CSR agenda and we mainly focus on these companies in this article. 
 
CSR and Environment 
 
The nature of oil and gas operations involves many potential negative environmental effects, 
particularly during exploration and production, including land clearance, oil spills and natural gas 
emissions.20 Environmental risks of oil and gas operations are heightened because oil and gas 
deposits are often located in developing economies near areas of high biological diversity and high 
ecological vulnerability, such as rain forests, mangroves and protected national parks.21 
 
While the use of terms such as “CSR” and “Sustainability” is relatively new, oil companies were 
prepared to voluntarily introduce some pollution-related initiatives from at least the 1960s. 
However, much of the public attention on oil companies was focused on marine pollution at the 
time. With the general rise in environmental awareness around the world since the 1970s, the 
quantity and scope of voluntary environmental initiatives have greatly increased and the 
environmental agenda has widened to include broader issues such as climate change and 
biodiversity. 
 
As one of the key signs of environmental engagement, oil companies now provide extensive 
environmental reports. Indeed, several comparative international studies have demonstrated that 
environmental reporting amongst oil and gas companies is more extensive compared with other 
sectors including utilities and various branches of manufacturing, although this has partly been a 
result of the industry’s greater environmental impact. In addition, a high percentage of oil 
companies uses third party verification of their environmental reports, compared with companies in 
most other sectors.22 According to the 2005 survey of CSR reporting by the consultancy firm 
KPMG, sixteen out of twenty oil and gas companies listed among the 250 largest corporations in 
the world reported on corporate responsibility issues, which represented a significant increase from 
58% to 80% between 2002 and 2005.23 
 
The author of this article has analysed recent social and environmental reports published by twenty 
oil and gas companies to ascertain the use of the “core” environmental indicators. The results are 
summarized in Table 1. “Reported” information means that the exact figures or data has been 
provided by the company. “Limited” information means that either no exact figures or no precise 
information has been provided (e.g. related information, a graph without a specific figure for 
effluents, or no precise information on the application of the ISO 14,001 standard).  
 
Table 1 demonstrates that Western multinational firms provide a substantial quantity of data. With 
regard to emerging market companies, there are huge differences in environmental reporting and 
environmental practices between different companies. Brazil’s Petrobras, South Africa’s Sasol and 
Hungary’s MOL have particularly sophisticated reporting mechanisms and sophisticated 
environmental management systems. In contrast, the Chinese oil company CNOOC and the 
Malaysian oil company Petronas not only have underdeveloped reporting mechanisms but also do 
not seem to address a number of important environmental issues in their operations. 
 
Obviously, environmental reporting is merely a means to an end, with the end being improved 
environmental practices. The reports allow us to trace performance over time and they provide 
evidence that oil companies have made some improvements in their environmental performance 
over the years.  
 
The most impressive evidence on environmental improvements in the oil and gas sector is provided 
by a historical comparison of oil spills from oil tankers. Since the 1970s, the number of large oil 
spills (above 700 tonnes) caused by oil tankers and other vessels has dramatically decreased from 
25.2 spills per year in the period 1970-1979 to 3.6 spills per year in the period 2000-2007. During 
the 1970s, about 30 major oil spills per year was not unusual. During the period 2000-2007, the 
highest annual number of major oil spills was five in 2004. The volume of oil spills has also 
dramatically decreased over the last three decades, except for the year 2002 when the Greek-owned 
oil tanker “Prestige” sank off the coast of Spain.24 
 
The most impressive evidence on environmental improvements by a single company were BP’s 
efforts to reduce gas emissions. In 1997, BP set itself the target of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from its own facilities by 10% from 1990 levels by 2010. The company was able to attain 
this goal nine years early at the end of 2001. The company then set itself a new target of ensuring 
that net emissions do not increase between 2001 to 2012.25 Since 2001, BP has made further 
progress. According to the company’s 2006 Sustainability Report, BP’s greenhouse gas emissions 
declined by a further 22% between 2002 and 2006, while the company’s oil production increased in 
the same period by over 30% and its natural gas production almost doubled. The Norwegian 
company Norsk Hydro was the only other company, which was able to achieve significant 
reductions in emissions despite an increase in oil and gas production. The other companies’ 
performance was far less impressive than that of BP and Norsk Hydro. Shell’s and Chevron’s gas 
emissions also declined from 2002 to 2006, but this could be attributed to declining oil production. 
The gas emissions of other companies such as Exxon and Repsol have actually increased 
significantly.  
 
At this point it should be pointed out that even corporate leaders in “sustainability” such as BP and 
Norsk Hydro may decide that commercial interests are more important than ecological concerns, as 
demonstrated by the construction of the BP-Statoil Baku-Ceyhan pipeline through the catchment 
area for mineral springs in Georgia.26 Nonetheless, the contrast between the greenhouse gas 
emissions policy of BP and the other companies points to the importance of the corporate will and 
the need for changes to internal management systems for achieving environmental improvements. 
Even if examples such as BP and Norsk Hydro are an exception rather than the rule, they 
demonstrate the great ability of multinational companies to restructure internal operations and re-
deploy resources in order to achieve significant improvements in environmental performance. 
 
The potential of CSR for addressing environmental issues can be explained by the convergence of 
environmental and business interests. Both companies and the environment can benefit from a 
reduction in gas flaring and energy efficiency, as the sale of previously flared natural gas or energy 
savings can lead to better financial performance. Indeed, studies show that a business case or win-
win outcomes of CSR is strongest with regards to environmental issues, as opposed to “social” 
issues such as health and safety, labour standards or local development.27 Interviewed oil company 
managers and engineers have narrated various examples of instances when they were proud of their 
company’s environmental improvements, for instance, reducing carbon dioxide emissions, 
implementing a zero-spill policy for the company or replacing steel tubes with chrome tubes. In 
various instances, company staff discovered that there was a convergence of environmental and 
business interests. 
 
Interview data also suggests that companies have been successful at environmental improvements 
because the technical and managerial capabilities of oil companies are particularly suited to 
addressing environmental issues. As the author has previously argued, when environmental 
improvements can be reduced to distinct technical tasks, oil companies can perform CSR tasks to a 
high standard.28 Environmental improvements such as new oil pipelines, improved forms of 
combustion or new production processes require similar engineering and managerial skills to those 
needed by oil companies in their commercial day-to-day operations, for instance, increasing 
production levels or reducing production costs. Technical problems need to be solved, new 
production processes and patents need to be developed, project teams need to be formed, and so on. 
 
There are various constraints to better environmental performance. Companies are often reluctant to 
make environmental improvements without external government pressure. There is still little 
comparability between environmental reports of different companies. Even the most responsible oil 
companies sometimes decide that commercial interests are more important than ecological 
concerns, for instance, when developing oil fields next door to a national park. Finally, the 
consumption of the oil and gas products sold by oil companies is inherently harmful to the 
environment due to carbon emissions. Nonetheless, the author’s findings suggest that CSR has the 
greatest potential for addressing environmental issues. 
 
CSR and Development 
 
The nature of oil and gas operations involves many interactions between companies and local 
communities during exploration and production, which has resulted in demands on oil companies to 
invest in the development of their local communities. At the same time, government agencies such 
as U.S. Agency for International Development and inter-governmental organizations such as the 
World Bank have in recent years made claims about the positive role that CSR could play in 
contributing to international development goals such as poverty alleviation and health 
improvements.29 
  
Oil companies are now making significant contributions towards community development schemes 
such as hospitals, schools and micro-credit schemes. Global spending by oil, gas and mining 
companies on community development programmes was estimated at over US$ 500 million per 
year in 200130, but the figure is certainly much higher today. The four oil majors – Shell, Exxon, BP 
and Chevron – spent almost US$ 500 million between themselves in 2006 alone. 
 
The biggest spender was Venezuela’s state-owned company PDVSA, which reportedly spent 
US$13.3 billion on “social development” in 2006 (up from US$ 6.9 billion in 2005). Other state-
owned companies such as Saudi Aramco and Russia’s Gazprom have also spent billions of dollars 
on social investments, although exact figures are frequently not available for many of these 
companies. Among the commercially operating multinational oil companies, the biggest spender 
was probably the Brazilian oil company Petrobras, which reportedly spent 545 million Brazilian 
Reais (about US$ 255 million) on “social investments” in 2006, compared with US$ 156 million by 
France’s Total, US$ 140 million by Shell and US$ 138 million by Exxon (see Table 2). Most of the 
funding was targeted at developing economies, where most oil production takes place and where the 
development needs are greatest. But a number of Western companies have also made considerable 
investments in their home country, notably Exxon spent US$ 79 million on local communities in 
the United States in 2006 (57% of the company’s social investment budget for that year). 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of community investments by 20 companies to ascertain to what 
extent oil companies fund community development schemes and what specific focus areas they 
target. All 20 companies support education initiatives and 18 out of 20 companies support health 
initiatives aimed at local communities (in addition to education or health initiatives for their 
workers). However, there is a wide variation in the scope of initiatives and the level of integration. 
The initiatives range from occasional financial donations to schools/hospitals to the construction of 
new schools and other facilities. Some initiatives appear to have little integration with the 
company’s activities and exhibit few signs of a “social strategy” (e.g. a single donation to a medical 
facility), other initiatives exhibit a high level of integration with the company’s operations (e.g. 
skills training that may help local people to find employment in the oil and gas sector). Among 
emerging market companies, South Africa’s Sasol and Brazil’s Petrobras appear to have much more 
sophisticated and integrated development programs than, for instance, China’s Sinopec or 
Hungary’s MOL. 
 
However, while there is a wealth of community investments, the current reporting on these 
activities is very weak. The companies’ social and environmental reports contain only input and no 
output measures for their social investment. In other words, companies provide information on how 
much they have spent on education or philanthropic activities or how many local stakeholders 
participated in a project, but they provide no measures of how effectively the money was spent. Not 
even the level of spending is comparable between companies because it is not clear what is included 
and what is not included (e.g. Exxon’s figure includes Public Relations-related donations to arts 
institutions and spending on public policy research). Not a single company systematically measures 
the effectiveness of its development interventions, either in terms of scientific measures (e.g. 
changes in health indicators related to health spending) or in terms of a value-for-money analysis. 
Oil companies seem to be simply satisfied that they spend money on “development”. Therefore, we 
do not know to what extent the community investment has actually yielded tangible benefits for the 
local people. 
 
Needless to say, community investments can be highly beneficial for stakeholders in the absence of 
externally verified measures of success and one could point to various examples of success, 
including Shell’s micro-credit schemes in Nigeria and Chevron’s agricultural initiative in the 
Philippines. One must also remember that the beneficiaries of oil company funded projects often 
have no alternative sources of support, particularly in developing economies where the government 
has failed in its development role. Yet the author’s findings suggest that, for all the money that oil 
companies have spent on development initiatives, there are surprisingly few tangible benefits for 
local stakeholders. 
 
The positive impact of social investments is severely constrained by the companies’ own motives 
for community development work. Firms may embark on social investments in order to follow 
public relations priorities, in order to enhance employee motivation or in order to maintain a 
“licence to operate” (i.e. maintaining a stable working environment). These corporate priorities 
often constrain development efforts. They may explain the earlier observation that corporate reports 
do not provide any indicators of how effectively the community development funds are spent, and 
that projects are often driven by short-term expediencies rather than the long-term development 
needs of a community.  
 
In contrast to best development practice advocated by the World Bank and other development 
institutions, CSR initiatives have often been conceived by the ‘helpers’ in the air-conditioned 
offices of oil companies and consultancies rather than through ongoing participation with the 
beneficiaries, which follows the logic of CSR serving corporate priorities. Where oil companies 
have consulted local communities, the consultation exercises have often been superficial and 
grossly inadequate. The involvement of the beneficiaries of CSR in implementing projects tends to 
be limited or non-existent and it may be limited at best to awarding contracts to locally based 
companies. While the involvement of locally based companies can be beneficial as it creates local 
employment, the author’s experiences from Africa are that these companies are often linked to local 
strongmen and the award of contracts simply serves to maintain a stable working environment. 
 
Above all, CSR initiatives are inherently flawed due to social attitudes of oil company staff, that 
means, social values that guide decisions made by company staff. The people in charge within oil 
companies (i.e. the company directors, asset managers etc.) usually have a managerial and/or 
engineering background. They are highly capable of dealing with technical and managerial 
challenges, which is reflected in their approaches to CSR. As Michael Blowfield argued, “The 
technologies used in CSR reflect a preference for measurement, quantitative data-processing and 
particular means of communication (…) segmenting information into quantifiable components to 
aid the process of management”.31 This preference can help to explain both the success of many 
environmental improvements and the failure of many social investments. When the corporate will is 
present and the CSR challenge can be reduced to distinct quantifiable technical and managerial 
tasks, oil companies can perform CSR tasks to a high standard. As discussed earlier, BP’s target to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions led by the company’s CEO John Browne was very successful. A 
technical/managerial challenge such as carbon dioxide emissions can be reduced to ‘metrics’, 
‘indicators’ or ‘guidelines’ and job performance can be quantified. Therefore, technical/managerial 
approaches can successfully address environmental issues, but they are often insufficient in 
addressing complex social problems where soft skills, patience and inter-personal skills are much 
more important.  
 
The limitations of technical/managerial approaches can be seen in the manner, in which local 
communities are consulted. A consultation exercise is inherently qualitative and inherently 
discursive requiring in-depth discussions and the building of a good rapport with people. Treating 
consultation from a technical/managerial perspective leads managers to speed up discussions with 
local communities and to try to achieve an immediate goal (such as a written list of local demands) 
rather than trying to build bridges with the local people and spending lengthy periods discussing the 
causes of problems. In the words of one development professional in Nigeria: ‘Shell learned fast 
new approaches and paid lip service but corrupted the practice, for example, PRAs [participatory 
rural appraisals] done in two days like an engineering exercise’. This approach helps to explain the 
companies’ failure to involve the beneficiaries of CSR. 
 
There are many examples of community investments, which lack basic equipment, which are 
unsuitable for the community or which are dysfunctional in some way. As one extreme example, an 
oil company built three town halls in one African local community in order to maintain a stable 
working environment in the process of building a pipeline, because the company followed the short-
term interests of three community chiefs who wanted to benefit personally from construction 
contracts. As another extreme example, a company built a fish processing plant in a local 
community, which was situated a long distance from trade markets, as a result of insufficient local 
consultation. 
 
In summary, local community development initiatives or “corporate social investments” in their 
current form have limited potential for fostering genuine local community development in practice. 
 
CSR and Governance 
 
Many oil-producing countries have suffered from economic underdevelopment, political 
mismanagement and military conflict, a well-known phenomenon called the ‘resource curse’ 
supported by many quantitative and qualitative studies.32 In most developed economies, the effects 
of the resource curse were minimised thanks to the diversification of the economy and prudent 
government policy. Furthermore, a small number of resource-rich developing countries — in 
particular, Botswana, Chile, and Malaysia — have not only been able to beat the “resource curse” 
but have achieved high economic growth.33 The biggest difference between successful and 
unsuccessful resource-rich countries was the quality of governance.34 In successful resource-rich 
countries, revenues from extractive industries exports were utilised to stimulate economic growth 
elsewhere in the economy, while the economy was insulated from resource curse effects through 
government policies such as the establishment of a “revenue stabilization” or a “savings fund”.35 In 
other words, the main challenge for oil-producing countries is how to improve wider societal 
governance. 
 
Oil companies have, until recently, rejected the notion that they should actively address macro-level 
governance issues. Governance in a society is ultimately related to the role of the government and 
companies have been reluctant to become drawn into the sphere of politics. While the notion of 
non-involvement in government affairs has not radically changed, a number of multinational oil 
companies including Shell, BP and Statoil now recognise that they can play a positive role in 
strengthening governance.  
 
BP in Azerbaijan is arguably by far the most wide-ranging attempt by a single company to address 
governance shortcomings. The company has publicly stated that it is prepared to ‘engage in 
policymaking processes and offer assistance, as appropriate, on the development and 
implementation of policy agendas, which include for consideration addressing poverty alleviation, 
revenue management, and domestic energy’.36 BP has co-operated with the government of 
Azerbaijan to facilitate expert advice on the management of the country’s state oil fund and oil 
revenues. Furthermore, the company operates a regional development initiative to initiate large-
scale and cross-regional development interventions in Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, with the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank as partners. Governance 
is to be improved through ‘civil society capacity building, strengthening the rule of law, and 
proffering expert advice and assistance’.37 
 
The initiatives by BP in Azerbaijan are exceptional in a number of ways, but other multinational 
companies also profess to contribute to better governance. Out of twenty oil and gas companies 
analysed, eleven explicitly state that they address governance issues. However, the scope of 
governance initiatives is very narrow. All of the eleven companies have largely focused on a single 
governance issue: revenue transparency, which refers to openness and access to information with 
regard to company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining. Nine of these 
companies are based in developed countries. Only two out of eleven companies – Brazil’s Petrobras 
and South Africa’s Sasol – are based in emerging markets, which reflects the relative sophistication 
of these two companies in addressing CSR challenges (see Table 3). 
 
Revenue transparency is now regarded as the priority initiative to address governance in resource-
rich countries by policy makers, the major oil companies and non-governmental organisations. It is 
assumed that transparency can contribute towards minimising the effects of the resource curse 
through beneficial political, economic and social effects. The main expected benefit of transparency 
is the reduction of corruption. Indeed, one transparency expert stated: ‘The word “transparency” is 
often used as a synonym for the absence of corruption. Transparency is also thought of as a solution 
or vaccine against corruption’.38 
 
BP was a pioneering oil company in terms of revenue transparency by publishing payments to the 
governments of Angola and Azerbaijan in 2001. None of the other oil companies followed BP’s 
lead in offering to individually publish their payments to governments. However, by 2009, 17 oil 
companies formally supported the Extractive Industry’s Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI 
was launched in 2003 to improve the transparency of revenues paid by oil, gas and mining 
companies to host governments, which in turn would limit corruption related to such revenues. A 
key strength of the initiative was that it would involve all companies in a member country, which 
avoids the resentment of the host government that BP faced in Angola. Another strength was the 
requirement to involve civil society and independent auditors, which helps to properly oversee the 
implementation of the EITI in a given country. 
 
Given that the EITI is the main governance initiative supported by oil companies, the author has 
investigated its impact. The available evidence suggests that the design and remit of the EITI have 
inherent limitations. Indeed, more than six years since the launch of the EITI, only one country has 
so far complied with the EITI validation – Azerbaijan. However, even the transparency of 
Azerbaijan is questionable. While the Economist Intelligence Unit praised the accountability of 
SOFAZ (the revenue savings fund in Azerbaijan), it pointed out that ‘International financial 
institutions have expressed concern that, although management of SOFAZ has proved relatively 
transparent, that accountability is lost once the funds are transferred for use into the state budget’.39  
 
Above all, the key limitation of the EITI and current transparency initiatives is their focus on 
revenues, not spending. In the words of one recent study on Azerbaijan, ‘The main weakness of 
EITI is the lack of reporting and monitoring of the government’s spending of oil revenues’.40 
Indeed, the premise of the EITI that revenue transparency provides benefits for implementing 
countries and investors is unproven and speculative, given that existing research focuses on 
government spending – not revenue transparency. Studies on transparency that found positive 
benefits of transparency focused on the transparency of spending and actual outcomes of spending. 
Previous research measured the transparency of individual countries according to quantitative 
indicators such as macro-economic forecasts41, the publication of International Monetary Fund 
reports on the macro-economic performance of countries42 and the quality of government budget 
documentation43. All of these studies imply that the quality of decision-making on spending is 
crucial, in terms of complying with international norms and accounting standards, publication and 
independent verification of government budgets and the actual outcomes of decision-making. Not a 
single study quoted in footnotes focused specifically on the transparency of revenues; indeed, there 
appears to be an assumption among researchers that transparency of revenues is a secondary 
concern. There is no scientific basis for the assertion that revenue transparency leads to better social 
or economic outcomes. Further limitations of the current governance initiatives have been analysed 
in Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility – Oil Multinationals and Social Challenges. 
 
In summary, while governance remains the main challenge for extractive industries, the main 
governance initiative – the EITI – has serious shortcomings and is unlikely to duplicate the success 
stories of countries such as Botswana or Chile. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence suggests that CSR has the greatest potential for addressing environmental challenges. 
Corporate reporting on the environment is steadily improving, new environmentally friendly 
technologies are being developed and tangible improvements are being made by some companies. 
Environmental challenges benefit from the specific expertise that companies possess, as technical 
and managerial skills greatly assist environmental improvements. Most crucially, environmental 
initiatives appear to lead to win-win outcomes: the environmental impact of companies is reduced, 
while companies benefit from lower operating costs, better equipment and innovation.  
 
In contrast, the evidence suggests that CSR has less potential for addressing problems related to 
community development and governance. Companies could greatly benefit from better community 
relations and improved governance: fewer operational losses as a result of community 
dissatisfaction, less corruption, improved corporate reputations, and so on. The host countries could 
also greatly benefit from improvements in human development and governance, in terms of 
increased private investment, higher levels of education, better public services, and so on. However, 
companies appear to be reluctant to address the issue of governance, while their approaches to 
community development are often ineffective. 
 
The findings from the author’s book Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility – Oil Multinationals 
and Social Challenges suggest here are two deeper underlying reasons as to why oil companies fail 
to effectively address development and governance concerns. First, the “business case for CSR” 
(that is, the use of social initiatives for attaining corporate objectives) sets limits on what such 
initiatives can achieve for broader society. While the business case has potential for successfully 
addressing environmental issues, making a business case for tackling poverty or governance failures 
is often much more difficult. Unlike development agencies, companies do not tend to prioritise 
overall development goals such as poverty reduction. Indeed, profit-maximising motives are often 
incompatible with good development practice 
 
Second, multinational companies often fail to acknowledge the full extent of their interactions with 
society and politics and they do not accept responsibility for macro-level issues – issues concerning 
the society-wide impact of their industry. While companies clearly exercise political influence, they 
tend to reject the notion that they could play a constructive role in helping to address governance 
failures. In general, CSR debates appear to have marginalized debates on governance and macro-
level solutions to complex society-wide problems. Yet CSR initiatives will not be able to tackle 
some of the key social and environmental challenges in the oil and gas sector without addressing 
governance. 
 
The limitations of CSR do not imply that oil companies should do nothing about societal issues. 
Firms are pressured to engage with the social and environmental aspects of their operations and 
they may benefit from the opportunities that CSR offers. Individual companies can still do a lot to 
improve their relationship with wider society, but they need to re-consider their approaches and 
they need to join hands with non-traditional partners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Core Environmental Indicators Reported by Selected Oil Companies in 2006 
 
Company Country Core Environmental Indicators 
  Hydrocarbo
n Spills 
Discharges 
to Water 
Greenhouse 
Emissions 
Flared Gas Energy Use Environmental 
Management 
Systems 
BP UK REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED 
Shell UK LIMITED LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED LIMITED LIMITED 
Chevron USA REPORTED - REPORTED LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED 
Exxon USA REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED LIMITED 
Statoil Norway LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED - 
Norsk Hydro Norway LIMITED LIMITED REPORTED LIMITED REPORTED - 
Total France REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED LIMITED 
ENI Italy REPORTED LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED 
Repsol Spain REPORTED REPORTED REPORTED - REPORTED REPORTED 
OMV Austria LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED - REPORTED LIMITED 
CNOOC* China - LIMITED - - - LIMITED 
Sinopec China - LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED 
Lukoil  Russia - LIMITED - - - LIMITED 
Gazprom Russia - LIMITED REPORTED - - LIMITED 
MOL Hungary LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED - REPORTED LIMITED 
Petrobras Brazil LIMITED - REPORTED LIMITED REPORTED REPORTED 
Petronas** Malaysia - - - - - REPORTED 
PKN Orlen Poland - - - - - LIMITED 
PTT Thailand LIMITED LIMITED REPORTED - - LIMITED 
Sasol South Africa - LIMITED REPORTED - REPORTED LIMITED 
* 2005 data was used for CNOOC due to the unavailability of the 2006 report  
** 2007 data was used for Petronas due to the unavailability of the 2006 report 
 
Table 2: Community Investments by Selected Oil Companies in 2006 
 
Company Country 2006 
spending 
(US$ million) 
Community Investment by Focus Area 
   Community 
Health 
Community 
Education 
Entrepreneurs 
/ SMEs 
Local 
sourcing 
BP UK 107 + + + + 
Shell UK 140 + + + + 
Chevron USA 91 + + + + 
Exxon USA 138 + + + + 
Statoil Norway 10 + + + + 
Norsk Hydro* Norway 45  + +  
Total* France 156 + + + + 
ENI* Italy 98 + + + + 
Repsol* Spain 34 + + +  
OMV Austria n/a + + +  
CNOOC China n/a  + +  
Sinopec China n/a + +   
Lukoil  Russia 62 + +   
Gazprom Russia n/a + +   
MOL Hungary n/a + +   
Petrobras* Brazil 255 + + + + 
Petronas Malaysia n/a + + +  
PKN Orlen Poland n/a + +   
PTT Thailand n/a + + +  
Sasol South Africa n/a + + + + 
* 2006 spending figure converted from local currency into US dollars, using currency exchange rates from the Economist 
magazine for 31 December 2006 
 
Table 3: Support for Revenue Transparency by Selected Oil Companies in 2006 
 
Company Country Support for Revenue 
Transparency 
Formal EITI 
Supporter 
BP UK + + 
Shell UK + + 
Chevron USA + + 
Exxon USA + + 
Statoil Norway + + 
Norsk Hydro Norway + + 
Total France + + 
ENI Italy + + 
Repsol Spain + + 
OMV Austria   
CNOOC China   
Sinopec China   
Lukoil  Russia   
Gazprom Russia   
MOL Hungary   
Petrobras Brazil + + 
Petronas Malaysia   
PKN Orlen Poland   
PTT Thailand   
Sasol South Africa +  
 
 
 
                                                 
Footnotes 
 
1 Text of this article has been re-published with the kind permission of Cambridge University Press. 
2 D Bielak, S Bonini and J Oppenheim, ‘CEOs on strategy and social issues’ 
(McKinsey&Company, 2007). 
3
 Jędrzej George Frynas, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility – Oil Multinationals and Social 
Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
4 In the course of this research, the author has interviewed staff from the following multinational oil 
companies: Shell, BP, Exxon, Chevron, Agip, Statoil, BG Group, Petrobras and PDVSA. 
5 The analysis covered the reports of ten Western multinational companies (Shell, BP, Chevron, 
Exxon, Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Total, ENI, Repsol and OMV) and ten multinational companies from 
emerging markets (China National Offshore Oil Corporation/CNOOC, China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corporation/Sinopec, Lukoil, Gazprom, MOL, Petrobras, Petronas, PKN Orlen, PTT and 
Sasol). 
6 JB Ciulla, ‘Why is business talking about ethics? Reflections on foreign conversations’ (1991) 34 
California Management Review 1, 67-86; S Pegg, ‘An emerging market for the new millennium: 
Transnational corporations and human rights’ in JG Frynas and S Pegg (eds), Transnational 
corporations and human rights (London: Palgrave, 2003); RC Sekhar, Ethical choices in business 
(Delhi: Response Books, 2002). 
7 H Fabig and R Boele, ‘The changing nature of NGO activity in a globalizing world: Pushing the 
corporate responsibility agenda’ (1999) 30 IDS Bulletin 3, 58-87. 
8 JG Frynas, ‘Editorial: Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Economies’ (2006) Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship 24, 16-19; J Baskin, ‘Corporate Responsibility in Emerging Markets’ (2006) 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship 24, 29-47. 
9 N Zulkifli and A Amran, ‘Realizing Corporate Social Responsibility in Malaysia’ (2006) Journal 
of Corporate Citizenship 24, 101-114. 
10 P Newell and A Muro, ‘Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility in Argentina’ (2006) 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship 24, 49-68. 
11 D Fig, ‘Manufacturing amnesia: CSR in South Africa’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 3, 599-
619. 
12 K Amaeshi, A Bongo, C Ogbechie, and O Amao, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Nigeria: 
Western mimicry or indigenous influences?’ (2006) Journal of Corporate Citizenship 24, 83-99; J 
Ahmad, ‘From Principles to Practice: Exploring Corporate Social Responsibility in Pakistan’ 
(2006) Journal of Corporate Citizenship 24, 115-129; N Zulkifli and A Amran, ‘Realizing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Corporate Social Responsibility in Malaysia’ (2006) Journal of Corporate Citizenship 24, 101-114; 
P Newell and A Muro, ‘Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility in Argentina’ (2006) 
Journal of Corporate Citizenship 24, 49-68.  
13 M Blowfield and JG Frynas, ‘Editorial: Setting New Agendas - Critical Perspectives on 
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 3, 499-
513 
14 JG Frynas, ‘The transnational garment industry in South and South-East Asia’ in JG Frynas and S 
Pegg. (eds), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).  
15 R Adams, ‘Fast Food, Obesity, and Tort Reform: An Examination of Industry Responsibility for 
Public Health’ (2005) 110 Business & Society Review 3, 297-320. 
16 G Palazzo and U Richter, ‘CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry’ (2005) 61 
Journal of Business Ethics 4, 387-401. 
17 Quoted in C Levenstein and J Wooding, ‘Introduction: Oil and the Contradictions of 
Development’ in C Woolfson and M Beck (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility Failures in the 
Oil Industry (Amityville, NY: Baywood, 2005), p.9. 
18  IH Rowlands, ‘Beauty and the beast? BP's and Exxon's positions on global climate change’ 
(2000) Environment and Planning C 18, 339-354;  JB Skjærseth and T Skodvin, Climate change 
and the oil industry: Common problem, varying strategies (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2003). 
19 V Marcel and JV Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, 2006); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘World 
Investment Report - Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development’ (New 
York and Geneva: United Nations, 2007), p.117. 
20  RB Clark (ed), The long-term effects of oil pollution on marine populations, communities and 
ecosystems (London: Royal Society, 1982); J Estrada, K Tangen and HO Bergesen, Environmental 
Challenges Confronting the Oil Industry (New York: Wiley, 1997); S White, ‘Oil pollution: 
Clearing up the myths’ (2002) 15 Geography Review 5, 16-20. 
21 D Austin and A Sauer, ‘Changing Oil: Emerging Environmental Risks and Shareholder Value in 
the Oil and Gas Industry’ (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2002). 
22 A Kolk, S Walhain and S van de Wateringen, ‘Environmental reporting by the Fortune Global 
250: Exploring the influence of nationality and sector’ (2001) 10 Business Strategy and the 
Environment 1, 15-28. 
23 KPMG, ‘International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting’ (Amsterdam: University of 
Amsterdam and KPMG Global Sustainability Services, 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
24 The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation website at www.itopf.com (accessed 27 
February 2008). 
25 Henderson Global Investors, ‘The Carbon 100 - Quantifying the Carbon Emissions, Intensities 
and Exposures of the FTSE 100’ (London: Henderson Global Investors, 2005). 
26 Centre for Civic Initiatives, Committee for the Protection of Oil Workers Rights, CEE 
Bankwatch Network, Green Alternative, Kurdish Human Rights Project, PLATFORM, and 
Urgewald, ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline: Human Rights, Social and Environmental Impacts 
(Georgia Section) - Final Report of Fact Finding Mission’ (Baku: Centre for Civic Initiatives and 
six other organizations, 2005). 
27 SustainAbility, ‘Buried treasure: Uncovering the business case for corporate sustainability’ 
(London: SustainAbility and United Nations Environment Programme, 2001); SustainAbility, 
‘Developing value: The business case for sustainability in emerging markets’ (London: 
SustainAbility, International Finance Corporation and Ethos, 2002); Innovest and Environment 
Agency, ‘Corporate Environmental Governance: A study into the influence of environmental 
governance on financial performance’ (London: Environment Agency, 2004). 
28 JG Frynas, ‘The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence 
from Multinational Oil Companies’ (2005) 81 International Affairs 3, 581-598. 
29 R Jenkins, ‘Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty’ (2005) 81 International 
Affairs 3, 525-540. 
30 JB Wells, M Perish and L Guimaraes, ‘Can oil and gas companies extend best operating practices 
to community development assistance programs?’ (Paper read at SPE Asia Pacific Oil and Gas 
Conference and Exhibition, 17-19 April, at Jakarta, Indonesia, 2001). 
31 M Blowfield, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Reinventing the meaning of development?’ 
(2005) 81 International Affairs 3, 515-524 at 522. 
32 A Gelb et al., Oil Windfalls: Blessing or curse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); JD 
Sachs and AM Warner, ‘The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth’ (1999) 59 Journal of 
Development Economics 1, 43-76; JD Sachs and AM Warner, ‘Natural Resources and Economic 
Development: The Curse of Natural Resources’ (2001) European Economic Review 45, 827-838; 
ML Ross, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’ (1999) 51 World Politics 2, 297-322. 
33 M Sarraf and M Jiwanji, ‘Beating the resource curse: The case of Botswana’ (Washington DC: 
The World Bank, 2001); DE Hojman, ‘The political economy of Chile's fast economic growth: An 
Olsonian interpretation’ (2002) 111 Public Choice ½, 155-178; N Usui, ‘Policy adjustments to the 
oil boom and their evaluation: The Dutch Disease in Indonesia’ (1996) 24 World Development 5, 
887-900. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
34 A Rosser, ‘Escaping the Resource Curse’ (2006) 11 New Political Economy 4, 557 – 570; P 
Stevens, ‘Resource curse and how to avoid it’ (2005) 31 Journal of Energy and Development 1, 1-
20. 
35 Stevens, ‘Resource curse and how to avoid it’. 
36 Quoted in LH Gulbrandsen and A Moe, ‘BP in Azerbaijan: A test case of the potential and limits 
of the CSR agenda?’ (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 4, 813-830 at 819.  
37 Gulbrandsen and Moe, ‘BP in Azerbaijan: A test case of the potential and limits of the CSR 
agenda?’. 
38 A Henriques, Corporate Truth - The Limits to Transparency (London: Earthscan, 2007) 137. 
39 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Country Profile 2006 – Azerbaijan’ (London: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2006), p.26. 
40 Gulbrandsen and Moe, ‘BP in Azerbaijan: A test case of the potential and limits of the CSR 
agenda?’, p.822. 
41 G Gelos and S-J Wei, ‘Transparency and International Portfolio Holdings’ (2005) 60 Journal of 
Finance 6, 2987-3020. 
42 R Glennerster and Y Shin, ‘Is transparency good for you, and can the IMF help?’ (Washington 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003). 
43 JE Alt and DD Lassen, ‘Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in 
OECD Countries’ (2006) 50 American Journal of Political Science 3, 530-550; JE Alt and DD 
Lassen, ‘Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt in OECD Countries’ (2006) 50 European 
Economic Review 6, 1403-1439. 
